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COMMENTS
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY:
PENNSYLVANIA'S TREND TOWARD ABOLITION
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Collected Legal Papers, p. 187.
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability historically
stems from the concept that "the King can do no wrong," and that a
vassal could not be heard to complain against his master.
The first case to extend the state immunity doctrine to a municipality
was Russel v. Men of Devon.' In that case, the population of an unincorporated county was held to be immune from suit for damages caused by a
defective bridge. The principal ground for the decision was the lack of
corporate funds from which satisfaction could be obtained. And, therefore,
the court would not permit the action to be maintained against the population of the whole county.
Pennsylvania approved this doctrine in the early case of Carr v. The
Northern Liberties,2 and it is still in effect today.' In the Carr case, the
court pointed out that inherent in the administration of government are
many evils and many wrongs incapable of being remedied; and the people
must suffer for the mistake of choosing incompetent officers.
However, the court in Carr did state that there could be recovery "in
some special cases." 4 These "special cases" have contributed enormously
to the current confusion in Pennsylvania with respect to the tort liability
of municipalities. However, it is not surprising to find confusion in this
area of the law. In dealing with this problem, the courts have been searching for a middle ground between conflicting policy considerations.5 In
determining the liability or non-liability of a municipality, the courts have
1. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
2. 35 Pa. 324 (1860).
3. See Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960).
4. Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 329 (1860).
5. On one side there is the common law concept of immunity, and on the other there is
the belief that the risk of wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual, but by
society as a whole.
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held the controlling factor to be whether the municipality was engaged in
a governmental or proprietary function. The unsatisfactory status of the
law is a result of the distinctions between proprietary and governmental
function. This distinction led Justice Cohen to conclude that "the attempt
to determine whether liability exists when a state or municipal activity is
conducted negligently by the test of whether it is a governmental or proprietary function has resulted in complete confusion. '
Even the criteria for determining whether the municipality is engaged
in a governmental or proprietary function is by no means settled. In the
case of Bell v. Pittsburgh,7 the plaintiff sustained injuries in the CityCounty Building as a result of a negligently operated elevator. The court
held the municipality liable irrespective of the fact that the primary use
of the building was in a governmental function. The rationale of the Bell
case was that in this instance the municipality was conducting a business
activity.
On the other extreme, in Scibila v. Philadelphia,' the municipality was
held immune from liability where the plaintiff was injured by a city-owned
truck which was used in hauling ashes to the city dump. The basis for the
Scibila decision was that this was an exercise of the municipality's police
power for the protection of the public health. The court held this activity
to be a governmental function notwithstanding the fact that a fee was
charged for the hauling thus producing incidental revenue.
The Bell and Scibila cases are two of the many cases which illustrate
the confusion of Pennsylvania's law on municipal tort liability. The purpose of this paper is to support the need for a change in the existing
Pennsylvania law and to examine a few recent Pennsylvania decisions
which indicate the eventual abrogation of this doctrine.
THE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ABOLISHED IN PENNSYLVANIA
For over four decades noted legal scholars have rejected the doctrine
and have urged its abolition.' The basic criticism of the doctrine is that it
is outmoded and indefensible in light of our present concepts of justice,
and that it permits our legal system to foster inequities and perpetuate
injustices. Needless to say, the chief complaint is well taken. It is apparent
that Pennsylvania's modern cities, such as Pittsburgh and Philadelphia,
6. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 3, at 505, 162 A.2d at 382.
7. 297 Pa. 185, 146 Atl. 567 (1929).
8. 279 Pa. 549, 124 At. 273 (1924).
9. PROSSER, TORTS 1004, 1010-1013 (3d ed. 1964); Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE:
L.J. 757 (1926); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLu-m. L. REV. 577
(1928); Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941); Leflar
and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.UJ,. REV. 1363 (1954); Shapo, Liability
for Police Torts, 17 U. MixAu L. REV. 475 (1963).
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are not unincorporated and unfunded as was Devon. Pennsylvania's
modern cities have substantial sums of money available to either pay
claims or obtain liability insurance. 10 Obviously, the rationale in Men of
Devon does not justify Pennsylvania's retention of the doctrine in the
Twentieth Century.
A most cogent argument for the retention of the doctrine was advanced
by Professor Carlos C. Cadena." Professor Cadena stated that:
Public agencies engage in activities of a scope and variety far
and beyond that of any known private business, and these activities affect a much larger number of the public than do the
activities of private enterprise. Many of the activities carried
on by government are of a nature so inherently dangerous that
no private entity would undertake the risk of performing them.
Activities such as law enforcement, fire fighting and the keeping
of jails are so important to the health, safety, and welfare of the
public that they could not possibly be abandoned. 2
Although this is the strongest argument given for the continuation of the
doctrine, it by no means justifies its retention. The fact that a municipality
is under a duty to protect the public while performing various functions
cannot justify its execution of these duties in a haphazard or negligent
manner. As stated by Justice Musmanno in a dissenting opinion:
The government may be sued for breach of contract, for
failure to properly maintain the highways, for negligence in the
manner of running its public parks, and for many other derelictions. Why may it not be sued for negligence in hiring men obviously unsuited for police work or retaining them after it has
been irrefutably established that they are a harm rather than a
protection to the public? 3 [Emphasis supplied.]
The majority of injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of municipal employees is due to the hiring and retention of employees unfit or
unqualified for the particular employment. This is especially true of
police departments. This generalization can best be illustrated by reviewing the records of police officers accused of police brutality. More often
than not, these records reveal that the accused officer has been suspended
from the force a number of times for a variety of reasons. This "harm"
to the public, as Justice Musmanno stated it, must be eliminated. By
making municipalities liable for all of the torts of their employees, longneeded "pressure" will be applied; and the municipalities will then be
forced to use discretion in their hiring and firing practices.
10. The estimated revenue for the City of Pittsburgh in 1966 is $67,648,907.00. City of
Pittsburgh Budget-1966, p. 80.
11. Address by Professor Cadena to Texas City Attorney's Association, July 3, 1963.
12. Ibid.
13. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 3, at 505, 162 A.2d at 382.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court will have little difficulty finding
outside support for the doctrine's abolition. Besides the attack by Professor
E. M. Borchard and other legal writers,14 in the last ten years judicial
attitude has taken an about face in a number of states. The trend began
with the landmark case of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach. 5 The
Supreme Court of Florida held that an action could be maintained against
a city for the death of a prisoner left in jail during a fire. In declaring the
doctrine anachronistic, the court stated:
The modern city is in a substantial measure a large business
institution. While it enjoys many of the basic powers of government, it nonetheless is an incorporated organization which exercises those powers primarily for the benefit of the people within
the municipal limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant
to the powers. To continue to endow this type of organization
with sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate the law of the
Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism.
Judicial consistency loses its virtue when it is degraded by the
vice of injustice. 6
7
Similar decisions were handed down in the cases of Simpson v. Miami'
and City of Miami Beach v. Nye. i8
In discarding the doctrine, the California Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Traynor, stated: "After a re-evaluation of the rule
of governmental immunity from tort liability we have concluded that it
must be discarded as mistaken and unjust." 9
In a case similar to the Pennsylvania case of Bell v. Pittsburgh,0 the
Supreme Court of Michigan, without resorting to the confusing test of
governmental versus proprietary function, allowed recovery where a man
fell to his death in an elevator shaft located in a municipally owned building. " In overruling the doctrine of governmental immunity, that court
stated:
In this case, we overrule preceding court made law to the contrary. We eliminate from the case law of Michigan an ancient
14. See authorities cited, supra note 9.
15. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
16. Id. at 133.
17. 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1963).
18. 156 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1963).
19. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458 (1961),
where an action was allowed against a hospital staff for negligence in their treatment of injuries; see also Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 124, 215 Cal. App. 2d 155 (1963) and
Chromiak v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 359, 219 Cal. App. 2d 860 (1963), where the holding of the Muskopf case has been affirmed.
20. Scibila v. Philadelphia, supra note 8.
21. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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rule inherited from the days of absolute monarchy which has
been productive of great injustice in our courts. By so doing we
join a major trend in this country toward the righting of an ageold wrong.22 [Emphasis supplied.]
By the use of similar language several other states have also repudiated
the doctrine,23 and a number of recent decisions have begun the movement toward the doctrine's abolition in other states."4
The courts that have taken it upon themselves to eliminate this age-old
doctrine from their common law realize that a law or a doctrine cannot
be stagnant. Laws must be dynamic, and therefore they must change with
the times. 5 When a law does not undergo slight variations as circumstances change, the day arrives when the law is outdated and its application too often results in injustice. Such is the status of the law of governmental immunity in Pennsylvania today.
THE ABOLITION OF THE DOCTRINE IS A JUDICIAL
FUNCTION
One of the most common reasons given by courts reluctant to make an
abrupt change in existing law is that the task is one for the legislature.2 6
If Pennsylvania is ever going to rid herself of the governmental immunity
doctrine, it will have to be done by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In
Pennsylvania, an apathetic legislature has ignored the pleas of its highest
court. As early as 1959, Mr. Justice Cohen appealed to the legislature to
rectify the injustices and confusion that existed as a result of the judicial
decisions on governmental immunity. 7 Two years later, in the Stouffer s
22. Id. at 250, 111 N.W.2d at 20 (dissenting opinion).
23. See Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964), where the drowning
death of a minor occurred in a city-operated swimming pool; Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963), where death and injuries resulted from the
negligence of the State Highway Commission; City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201
(Alaska 1962), where decedent's asphyxiation was caused by negligence with respect to fire
fighting; aff'd in Sche4le v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963), where injuries
arose out of police brutality; Spanel v. Moundsview School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279,
118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), where a defective slide in a kindergarten classroom caused plaintiff's injuries; Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), where
a minor was injured at a playground when a trap door was negligently left opea by a city
employee; Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959), where a child was injured because of a negligently operated school bus.
24. See Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); McAndrews v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n,
316 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1957).
25. Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting).
26. See Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958)
(Cohen, J., concurring) ; Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960) (Cohen, J.,
concurring).
27. Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958).
28. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 3.
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case; Mr. Justice Cohen, in a concurring opinion in which Mr. Justice
Benjamin R. Jones joined, renewed his request for legislative action in
this area. Eight years have passed since Mr. Justice Cohen's first appeal
to the legislature and there has been no response. Therefore, there is little
reason to expect legislative activity in this area in the future.
The doctrine of governmental immunity is of judicial origin. The result
in the Men of Devon case was not based upon a legislative prohibition.
It was a court-made law. And since that time, the courts have perpetuated
this doctrine without assistance from the legislature. Accordingly, there
need be no legislative intervention to repudiate this rule of law.
The task with which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is now faced is
not unique.29 Other courts have been faced with the argument that the
repudiation of the doctrine is a legislative function. The courts that have
overturned the doctrine have advanced reasons which are favorable to
judicial action in this area. The court in Stone v. Arizona Highway
Comm'n" met the traditional argument on these terms:
It has been urged by the adherents of the sovereign immunity
rule that the principle has become so firmly fixed that any change
must come from the legislature. In previous decisions . . . this

court concurred in this reasoning. Upon reconsideration, we
realize that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally
judicially created. We are not convinced that a court-made rule,
when unjust and outmoded, does not necessarily become with
age invulnerable to judicial attacks. This doctrine having been
engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process. 3
In Haney v. City of Lexington, 2 the Kentucky court advanced another
reason for a judicial assumption of the burden of abolishing the doctrine:
It seems to us that an equally reasonable assumption is that
the legislature might expect the courts themselves to correct an
unjust rule which was judicially created. The very machinery of
the short biennial session of the general assembly denies to it
the time or, for that matter, the inclination to examine the various doctrines and theory of common law torts. A great number
of the legislators are
not lawyers nor are they interested in the
33
details of the law.

29. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is again faced with the governmental immunity
problem in the case of Graysneck v. Heard, No. 23 March Term, 1966, which was argued
in Pittsburgh during March of 1966.
30. 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
31. Id. at 393, 381 P.2d at 113.
32. 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
33. Id. at 741.
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The legislative function argument was recently considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital,34 Mr.
Justice Musmanno, speaking for a majority, abolished the doctrine of
charitable immunity in Pennsylvania. The language of Mr. Musmanno
is applicable to the governmental immunity problem:
The appellee and the amicus curiae insists that if the charity
immunity doctrine is to undergo mutation, the only surgeon
capable of performing the operation is the Legislature. We have
seen, however, that the controverted rule is not the creation of
the Legislature. This court fashioned it, and, what it put together it can dismantle. When the Supreme Court of Washington
was considering the very question, it said, in the case of Pierce
v. Yakima Valley Hospital Ass'n, 260 P.2d 765: "We closed
our court room doors without legislative help and we can likewise open them." 5
There is no logical reason why the words of Mr. Justice Musmanno cannot be used to rebut the proponents of the doctrine's inevitable defense.
It is very possible that one of the reasons the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has been hesitant to abolish the governmental immunity doctrine
is the consequent increase in litigation. And since this litigation will be
of great variety, specific procedures and limits on these actions must be
set forth. Admittedly, legislative action would be the best way to establish
the necessary limits. However, this is unlikely in Pennsylvania since the
legislature continues to remain inactive on the subject.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should not be overly concerned with
the impact of a decision abolishing the doctrine. A judicial decision abrogating governmental immunity will not restrict the legislative branch of
the state from taking action if it so desires. 6 "The legislature still has the
last word and may restore the court abolished rule if it determines public
policy so requires."3 It is admitted that some restraints are necessary
for the protection of public funds and that many problems will arise as
a result of such a decision. However, a decision abrogating the doctrine
in Pennsylvania is needed to motivate the legislature.
Pennsylvania's present situation is similar to that which existed in
California prior to the decision of Muskopf v. Corning HospitalDistrict.8
In Muskopf, the court abolished the doctrine in California and, as a result, numerous suits and complicated problems arose. However, because
of this decision, the California legislature was forced to take the long34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965).
Id. at 503, 208 A.2d at 201, 202.
See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Id. at 43, 115 N.W.2d at 627 (concurring opinion).
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
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needed action. 9 Therefore, inasmuch as eight years have passed since the
first judicial request for legislation, it is quite clear that the judiciary
must be the moving force to rid Pennsylvania of this archaic rule of law.
RECENT DECISIONS INDICATING A TREND
TOWARD ABOLITION
The only possible way to justify the doctrine of governmental immunity
today is to rely solely on stare decisis, thus ignoring the countless and
compelling reasons for a change which have arisen since the rule was first
enunciated almost two hundred years ago. As to the present role of stare
decisis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Griffith v. United Air Lines,

Inc.,4" stated:

"...

it is of utmost importance that our court re-examine

its position in this field of law and make certain that our rules are in
harmony with the realities of this age."'" The court then proceeded to say:
...we must not perpetuate an absolute rule by blind adherence
to the principal of stare decisis. Although adherence to that principal is generally a wise judicial action, it does not rigidly command that we follow without deviation earlier pronouncements
which are unsuited to modern experience and which no longer
adequately serve the interest of justice. Surely, the orderly development of the law must be responsive to new conditions and
to the persuasions of superior reasoning.4 2
In Flagiello, Mr. Justice Musmanno put the final nail in the coffin of
stare decisis when he stated:
A rule that has become insolvent has no place in the active
market of current enterprise. When a rule offends against reason, when it is at odds with every precept of natural justice,
and when it cannot be defended on its own merits, but has to
defend alone on a discredited genealogy, courts not only possess
the inherent power to repudiate, but, indeed, it is required, by
the very nature of judicial function, to abolish such a rule. 48
When the words of Mr. Justice Roberts 44 and Mr. Justice Musmanno 45
are applied to the governmental immunity doctrine, its death is inevitable.
39. After Muskopf, the 1963 session of the California legislature provided for a ninety
day moratorium on tort actions brought against public agencies. The purpose of the moratorium was to give the legislature time to fully consider the problems involved and to proscribe
legislation.
40. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
41. Id. at 11, 203 A.2d at 801.
42. Id. at 23, 203 A.2d at 806.
43. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, supra note 34, at 513, 208 A.2d at 206.
44. Supra notes 40 and 41.
45. Supra note 43.
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The cases of Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co.4" and Malter v.
South Pittsburgh Water Co. 7 illustrate a recent change in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's position on the status of governmental immunity.
These cases were distinguished from those which previously held that a
mere failure to supply water does not constitute a breach of duty owed
to the injured party by the water company or the municipality. Doyle
and Malter held that the duty involved was one requiring reasonable care
in the maintenance of a water system. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice
Jones in his dissent, this was a change in the law and eliminated municipal
tort immunity for misfeasance in the performance of governmental functions. These decisions, for the first time in a hundred years, increased the
liability of municipalities.
The Griffith, Flagiello,Doyle and Malter cases clearly illustrate a trend
toward the modernization of Pennsylvania's law. Stare decisis no longer
influences modern judges to the extent that it did in the past.
CONCLUSION
As previously mentioned, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court once
again has the opportunity to abolish the governmental immunity doctrine.4" The facts of Graysneck v. Heard,4 9 which was argued in the
Western District during the March Term, present an ideal situation for
a landmark case in this area. In this case a City of Pittsburgh police
officer, who had been suspended from the force on eleven different occasions for various reasons, negligently shot and killed the plaintiff's decedent while he was performing his "duty" as a police officer. A demurrer
to plaintiff's complaint, which was sustained in the lower court, was based
on the doctrine of governmental immunity. A fact situation such as this
clearly demonstrates the great injustice that the doctrine promulgates and
the reason this case is ideal is that there is a clear-cut case of negligence
against both the police officer and the City of Pittsburgh.
Now is the time for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to realize that
its legislature will not legislate in this area unless they are coerced. The
motivating force should be the court's decision in the Graysneck case.
John W. Latella
46.
47.
48.
49.

414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964).
414 Pa. 231, 198 A.2d 85 (1964).
Supra note 29.
Ibid.

